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Stabilizing Lebanon:
Peacekeeping or
Nation-Building
WILLIAM K. MOONEY, JR.

T

he summer 2006 Israel-Hezbollah war demonstrated that Israel views
the problem of Hezbollah geostrategically, as a proxy military challenge
supported by its long-term enemies Syria and Iran. This view led the government of Israel to attempt the eradication of Hezbollah through the application
of overwhelming military force, an effort that was flawed in design and failed
in execution. Similarly, the United Nations has viewed the problem as a conflict between two warring military entities, a problem it has unsuccessfully
sought to mitigate since 1978 with the deployment of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). Colored through the lens of the global war
on terrorism, the United States also views the threat created by Hezbollah
geostrategically, the influence of a top-tier terrorist organization financed by
Iran and supported by Syria.
Together, these views led to the delayed implementation of a ceasefire in 2006 and the misguided belief that Israel would be successful in its efforts against Hezbollah. After 34 days of air and ground engagements the
Hezbollah continued to fight, delivering what some have termed a strategic
victory. Meanwhile, the state of Lebanon was once again decimated, with
more than 1,200 civilians killed, 130,000 homes destroyed, and damage to
the economy and infrastructure totaling over $7 billion.1 The post-war response of the United Nations and the United States continues to focus on the
symptom (Hezbollah), rather than the root cause that allows such an organization to exist; the weakness of the Lebanese government.
This conflict should be seen in the context of a series of conflicts that
have afflicted Lebanon during its history. In striking similarity to the current
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crisis in Iraq, Lebanon has struggled with internal sectarian conflict, the rise
of transnational armed groups, foreign occupation, insurgency, and the use of
its territory as both a battleground and a launching pad for regional conflicts
fought by proxy. While outside actors have played a major role, the weakness
of the Lebanese government lies at the foundation of these problems. The
Lebanese government finds itself unable to exercise the most fundamental elements of state sovereignty: the control of borders and a monopoly on the use
of force. Thus, any international effort to stabilize and reconstruct Lebanon in
the wake of this most recent conflict needs to focus on the political objective
of strengthening the Lebanese government.

The Expanded UNIFIL
The United Nations and American-led international response to the
summer 2006 Israel-Hezbollah war was the passage of United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1701. 2 The central initiative of UNSCR
1701 was the dramatic expansion of UNIFIL and the simultaneous deployment of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) to South Lebanon. At the tactical
level, the expansion of UNIFIL and the deployment of the LAF enabled Israel
to withdraw its forces from South Lebanon without ceding the terrain to its
antagonist, Hezbollah. Strategically, the LAF deployment serves the critical
mission of strengthening the sovereignty of Lebanon’s government, demonstrated by placing Lebanese soldiers on the border with Israel for the first time
in decades. Simultaneously, the expanded UNIFIL deployment is intended to
support the LAF’s southern deployment and provide political space for the
Lebanese government as it tries to strengthen its institutions.
The UNIFIL mandate and peacekeeping presence have been in existence in various forms since their inception in 1978. Prior to the 2006 war,
UNIFIL consisted of 2,000 lightly armed peacekeepers. 3 This force was of insufficient size and capability to provide any form of credible deterrent to hostile forces on either side of the Israeli-Lebanese border, commonly referred to
as the Blue Line. With the unilateral withdrawal of Israeli forces in 2000,
Hezbollah had extensive freedom of maneuver allowing them to arm and
train local militias and to conduct detailed surveillance of opposing Israeli
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forces. They were also able to prepare an extensive series of fighting positions, weapons caches, and concealed rocket launch sites that proved exceptionally effective during the summer 2006 war.4
UNSCR 1701 expanded the size of the UN force dramatically and
upgraded the force’s capabilities, due to the fact that the primary contributors
are “top-tier” military forces, mostly from Europe, but also including China
and India. UNIFIL is now structured with military capabilities that are robust
by any peacekeeping standard, including armored and mechanized units, artillery, and even air defense.5 Despite the UNSCR 1701 mandate for up to
15,000 UN troops in UNIFIL, the organization has deployed just over 12,000
troops, as of late January 2007.6
Perhaps more significant than the increased size of UNIFIL was its
new mandate. UNSCR 1701 specifically charges UNIFIL to:
 Monitor the cessation of hostilities.
 Accompany and support the Lebanese Armed Forces as they deploy throughout the south, including along the Blue Line, as Israel withdraws
its armed forces from Lebanon.
 Coordinate its activities toward a permanent ceasefire and a
long-term solution with the government of Lebanon and the government of
Israel.
 Extend its assistance to help ensure humanitarian access to civilian populations and the voluntary and safe return of displaced persons.
 Assist the Lebanese Armed Forces in taking steps toward the establishment of a demilitarized area between the Blue Line and the Litani River.
 Assist the government of Lebanon, at its request, to secure its borders and other entry points to prevent the entry in Lebanon without its consent
of arms or related materiel.7
Both the mission mandate and force authorization in UNSCR 1701
are aggressive by comparison to previous UN peacekeeping operations in Lebanon, with the implication that this force would be powerful enough to confront Hezbollah militarily, if required. However, a year into the expanded
mission, it is apparent that neither UNIFIL nor the Lebanese government possesses the will to directly confront or forcibly disarm Hezbollah. The collective
sensitivity against the implied task of countering Hezbollah is inhibiting forces
from completing some explicit tasks found in the mandate. Specifically,
UNIFIL has not executed the “accompany and support” mission. From the perspective of military tactics, the directive to “accompany and support” requires
UNIFIL and the LAF to conduct operations together, in a physically combined
patrol or at the very least within direct observation and communication of the
other force. According to UNIFIL and LAF officers, this is not happening, with
both UNIFIL and the LAF conducting independent patrols and checkpoints
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throughout the zone.8 The February exchange of small-arms fire between Israeli and Lebanese forces along the Blue Line is a poignant example of the need
for UNIFIL forces to fully execute this mandate.9 UNIFIL needs to be more
vigilant in its close accompaniment of the LAF and its surveillance of activities
on the Blue Line if future conflict is to be avoided.
The Lebanese army’s deployment to the Blue Line is a vital step
toward the government of Lebanon’s ability to establish control over its territorial borders, a fundamental element of state sovereignty. UNIFIL has enabled
that deployment, providing fuel, transportation, and significant logistical support to the desperately ill-equipped Lebanese Armed Forces.10 These military
activities in support of the Lebanese army and government are tremendously
important toward achieving the “long-term solution” noted in the mandate. It is
more valuable for UNIFIL forces to empower and supervise as the Lebanese
army supports the government in asserting its sovereignty, rather than rely on
external powers. Beyond the provision for logistical support, UNIFIL does not
have an explicit mandate to provide military training or assistance, something
that could enhance the capabilities of the Lebanese force.
The structure of UNIFIL also presents several challenges for the legitimacy of both the UN mission and the Lebanese government. First, the heavy organization and weaponry of the intervention force resembles that of a peace
enforcement operation, where the intervention units use force or threat of force
to coerce compliance of warring parties.11 This lends credence to Hezbollah suspicions that UNIFIL plans to attack Hezbollah and disarm it. Second, this
heavily armed presence is likely to generate hostility among the Lebanese population in southern Lebanon. UNIFIL patrols of heavy tracked vehicles have
caused further damage to the already devastated road network in the south. The
image of heavily armored UN peacekeepers is similar to that of forces in Iraq,
widely viewed by the population as an “occupation” force. Also, UNIFIL deployed without any organic civil affairs or information operations units, leaving
it without a structured means to interface with local leaders, to craft and disseminate messages, or to leverage information and influence the population. Information operations are vital, as locals who perceive that the deployed force is
providing them a tangible benefit are much more likely to inform of possible
dangers and plots.12 To their credit, UNIFIL has been able to provide limited
medical and veterinary care to the population of the south, with one Level II hospital being established by Belgium in Tibneen.13 This effort is extremely popular,
as access to western-quality medicine is extremely rare in South Lebanon.
UNIFIL needs to do more along these lines in an effort to avoid the perception of
“occupier,” whose real mission is the destruction of Hezbollah. For the Lebanese
people in general, and the Shia community in particular, image of occupation is
decidedly negative (built upon Israel’s previous occupation of South Lebanon
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and current presence in Palestinian territory) and generates widespread sympathy for armed resistance.14 No group has more effectively built upon this sympathy than Hezbollah. Thus, to the extent that UNIFIL looks and behaves like an
occupying force, it emboldens the call for resistance and legitimizes Hezbollah’s
justification for retaining its armed capability.

Defining and Dealing with Hezbollah
Inspired by the Iranian Revolution of 1979, Hezbollah emerged in
1982 in response to Israel’s occupation of southern Lebanon. 15 Professor
Augustus Richard Norton recently stated that “if Iran was the mother of
Hezbollah, Israel was its stepfather because Israel’s two-decade-long occupation fostered and honed Hezbollah.” 16 Trained and funded by the Iranian
Revolutionary Guards, Hezbollah began as an exceptionally violent and
ideological organization that eschewed politics and extensively employed
terror (most notably kidnappings, assassinations, and suicide bombings) to
weaken its opponents. As President George W. Bush pointed out in his 2007
State of the Union Address, Hezbollah is only second to al Qaeda in the number of Americans killed by terrorism. 17 Yet since its murderous beginnings in
the 1980s, Hezbollah has grown in both size and complexity.This growth has
changed its tactics and goals. Beginning in 1992, Hezbollah made a strategic
decision to participate in parliamentary elections. Thus, the organization was
(partially) resorting to a peaceful political process to obtain its goals, which
were becoming increasingly national and less ideological in nature. 18
Despite its foray into politics, Hezbollah maintained its emphasis
on armed resistance. Benefiting from support of Iran and Syria, as well as
years of combat operations against Israeli forces in southern Lebanon,
Hezbollah’s military wing became increasingly professional and capable.
Simultaneously, Hezbollah developed a popular base by providing social
services to the neglected and impoverished Shia community, as well as
creating a world-class television and Internet operation, Al-Manar. 19 Hezbollah now is a classic nationalist insurgency, not unlike the Irish Republican Army with its political wing Sinn Fein. Even after Israel unilaterally
withdrew from Lebanon in 2000, Israel’s retention of the disputed Shaba’a
Farms area and the Lebanese government’s inability to control South Lebanon enabled Hezbollah to resist Israel by exercising a strategy based on border skirmishes, rocket attacks, and the preparation of defensive positions.
Hezbollah’s defense-in-depth proved formidable during the July 2006 war
and contributed to Israel’s inability to destroy its forces. 20 Israel’s strategy
appeared to be aimed at inflicting pain on the Lebanese people as a whole,
with the expectation they would turn on Hezbollah. Yet, Israel’s overreaction and seemingly wanton destruction only consolidated popular sup32
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port for the resistance in both the Shia community and among Lebanese who
had traditionally opposed Hezbollah. The war was viewed as an Israeli defeat by many Israelis and Lebanese. 21 Thus, the war gave Hezbollah greater
legitimacy and political clout; a non-state actor repelled the invader and had
defeated Israel on the field of battle by merely surviving.
With the cessation of hostilities and the UN’s expansion of UNIFIL,
Hezbollah has shifted its efforts to gaining additional political power. Allied
with the Christian party of Michel Aoun, its boycott of the government of
Prime Minister Fouad Siniora and subsequent demonstrations are challenging the Lebanese government’s ability to retain power. The Hezbollah-Aoun
alliance vehemently opposes the Siniora government’s pro-western agenda,
most notably the establishment of an international tribunal to prosecute the
killers of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. Emanating from the UN’s investigation conducted by Serge Brammertz, a criminal tribunal has the potential to implicate Syria, Hezbollah’s local sponsor. 22 Since the walkout of five
Shia ministers and a Christian cabinet minister in November 2006, the alliance has used public demonstrations and an extensive media campaign to
pressure the government into meeting their demands. Specifically, the alliance is seeking early parliamentary elections and the formation of a national
unity government, in which their political bloc would have at least one-third
plus one seat, guaranteeing them the ability to block objectionable legislation
(such as acceptance of the Hariri tribunal). 23
While these machinations should be seen as yet another phase of an
ongoing insurgency and effort to gain political power, it is extremely important to note that Hezbollah has not used their military capabilities to realize
their goals. Having demonstrated its lethality against a well-trained and
equipped Israeli force, Hezbollah’s military capabilities are superior to those
of the Lebanese army. But rather than pursuing a violent overthrow in an effort to establish an Islamic state, Hezbollah’s leadership is attempting to work
within the current government framework. It is also instructive to note that
they are willing to ally themselves politically with a Christian party in their
effort to attain power. This is not the same group that called for the establishment of a Shia Islamic theocracy in the 1980s. While they have retained their
armed wing as a hedge, their political faction seeks increased representation
commensurate with the growing Shia population in Lebanon.
Once Hezbollah is recognized as both a military and political insurgency, then any strategy designed to contain or end the insurgency needs to be
based on accepted counterinsurgency principles. One of the most widely recognized of these principles is the fact that counterinsurgency operations
should focus on developing effective governance and enhancing the government’s legitimacy in the eyes of the population.24
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Strengthening the Lebanese Government
If good governance and enhancing governmental legitimacy are
key to defeating an insurgency, then the long-term solution to the cycle of
violence in Lebanon requires more than military action; such as economic
development, social reconciliation, and the enhancement of government
capacity. A senior diplomat in Beirut explained, “The government of Lebanon governs Beirut, but doesn’t govern in the south, the north, or in the
Beka’a Valley.”25 The government’s inability to fully exercise its writ and
provide services outside the capital creates essentially ungoverned spaces
that permit organizations such as Hezbollah to exist. While Hezbollah is the
strongest non-state actor, it is not alone in challenging the state’s monopoly
of force; sectarian militias, armed Palestinian groups, and new Sunni
extremist groups inspired by al Qaeda all have established a presence in the
rural regions of Lebanon.26 Many of these rural areas receive little or no
essential services from the government. Particularly in southern Lebanon,
where whole villages were obliterated by the July war, there is a great need
for the government to step in and make a difference. 27 Despite the widely
publicized Hezbollah payments (funded by Iran) to those who lost their
homes, that money has not put all the villagers back to work or restored their
livelihood. 28
Unfortunately, the Lebanese government and its international partners have been slow to mobilize reconstruction efforts, allowing Hezbollah to
lead in the race for hearts and minds. The government’s failure to quickly respond is perceived as apathy and disregard for the Shias’ welfare, and it continues to ignite the long-held grievances of a marginalized population. 29
Indeed, much of the initial United Nations Development Program’s reconstruction effort and funding have gone to rebuilding infrastructure in greater
Beirut, with comparatively little going to the devastated south. 30 The January
2007 Economic Reform Program submitted to international donors by the
Siniora government states an intention to offset expenditures by “closing the
Fund for the Displaced and the Council of the South,” created as the government’s vehicle to reconstruct South Lebanon. 31 If the Siniora government and
the international community want to separate the insurgency from the population, they need to be able to compete with Hezbollah in terms of resources
and services.
The slow and disjointed nature of the ongoing stabilization and reconstruction effort is symptomatic of a fundamental lack of unity. On the political front with regard to the United Nations’ effort, there are a number of
high-level UN envoys to Lebanon, none of which has clear authority to oversee or coordinate the actions of the many UN organizations working in the
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country. Geir Pedersen, formerly the Envoy for South Lebanon, was named
Special Coordinator for Lebanon in February 2007. While his new title is encouraging, what is really required is a mandate that delineates lines of authority and provides adequate staffing if he is to successfully fill the political
void. Terje Roed-Larsen remains the Special Envoy for the Implementation
of UN Security Council Resolution 1559, a resolution with the sole requirement to disarm militias. 32 In perhaps the most politically visible UN initiative,
Serge Brammertz serves as Commissioner of the UN International Independent Investigation Commission into the assassination of former Lebanese
Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. While there are many areas of overlap in the political portfolios of these UN leaders, none has clear authority to orchestrate
the actions of UNIFIL or the myriad of other UN agencies. 33 Each of these entities reports to its home office at United Nations headquarters in New York,
including the UNIFIL Military Commander, who reports to a Strategic Military Cell in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. 34 The existing structure squanders resources that could be directed at reconstruction, but are
instead spent on multiple layers of bureaucracy. In other post-conflict interventions, the United Nations has named a Special Representative to the Secretary General with the mandate to coordinate all UN activities (including
military operations) in an integrated mission. Unfortunately, the UN has not
provided this type of leadership or a headquarters structure for the Lebanon
effort.35 The compartmentalized nature of the UN structure reflects a view
that the UNIFIL mission is separate from and unrelated to the missions of
providing humanitarian aid or investigating the Hariri murder. In fact, these
missions are all facets of a single nation-building mission in the midst of an
insurgency.
The US effort to bolster the Lebanese government suffers from a
similar problem of focus, exacerbated by an inability to deliver timely aid.
Seeing the Lebanon-Hezbollah-Israel problem through the prism of the
global war on terrorism, the US response has been to channel aid to military
security and humanitarian relief programs, while providing limited resources
to strengthen the Lebanese government’s non-security institutions. In August
2006, President Bush pledged $230 million in assistance to Lebanon, and the
United States did an admirable job of providing immediate humanitarian relief. However, as of January 2007, only $120 million of the initial $230 million pledged had been delivered. The remaining funds are awaiting the
completion of the fiscal year 2007 budget and fulfillment of long-lead-time
equipment orders. At the height of the Siniora government’s political crisis in
January 2007, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice announced an additional
$770 million in assistance at the Paris III conference. 36 While Congress appropriated the funds in the fiscal year 2007 emergency supplemental bill, it
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will take more time to program and apportion these funds. 37 In the most optimistic scenario, these funds will not be released until later this year. 38
Even for the funds already allocated to Lebanon, the United States
has been challenged to quickly turn those funds into “deliverables,” actual
items or programs on the ground. The US Foreign Military Financing program was not designed as a rapid-response system, and the arcane process
from apportionment of funding to the actual delivery of an item can take 18 to
24 months, dependent on technology transfer approval, availability, production schedules, and transportation. 39 Making matters more difficult is the ongoing effort to equip the Lebanese Armed Forces. This program has suffered
from competition for resources with US forces that are equipping and reorganizing for combat in Iraq and Afghanistan. Some of the most immediate needs
of the LAF have been trucks and ammunition, both items that are in tight supply.40 For example, in January 2007, the US was only able to make a symbolic
delivery of 20 of the 285 trucks promised to the LAF. The remainder must
await production and shipping.41
The majority of pledged US funds for Lebanese post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction are targeted against military or security requirements. A close examination of the fiscal year 2008 international affairs
budget request shows that 60 percent of the $770 million in new US assistance will go to fund the military and police initiatives, while only 40 percent
is allocated to humanitarian, economic, and social programs. If the Lebanese
government’s inability to provide essential services is the driving force of
popular support for its political opposition, then a primary focus of the strategy to empower the government needs to be the expansion of its capacity to
govern and serve. The proponents for heavy military assistance point to the
need to stabilize the security situation first, but the requirement for jobs and
services has proven to be an equally essential part of the security equation in
post-conflict interventions.42
The impact of targeted security assistance on internal Lebanese politics needs to be factored into the equation. During the opposition-led Beirut
demonstrations in January 2007, most local observers regarded the Internal
Security Forces (ISF) as dominated by Sunni groups and partial to the 14
March ruling coalition. 43 The recent US delivery of riot-control gear and vehicles to the ISF may be viewed as empowering the Sunnis to take on the Shia,
thereby exacerbating the sectarian aspect of the conflict. 44 The Lebanese
army, on the other hand, is widely viewed as an impartial, cross-confessional,
national institution (despite a high number of Christians in the senior officer
ranks). The LAF commander, Lieutenant General Michel Suleiman, is a
protégé of pro-Syrian Lebanese President Emile Lahoud, yet has urged the
army to exercise restraint and neutrality in the face of protests.45 This restraint
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and neutrality is critical to the Lebanese government’s efforts to gain legitimacy against sectarian challengers.
As previously mentioned, the deployment of the LAF to the Blue
Line is a critical step to enhancing the legitimacy of the government. However, the LAF needs to not only be able to take control of the nation’s borders,
but its training and equipment must also improve qualitatively if it is to be
seen as a capable replacement for Hezbollah as the “defenders of Lebanon.”
For example, a ubiquitous reminder of Lebanese vulnerability to its Israeli
neighbor is the overflight of southern Lebanon and Beirut by Israeli warplanes. These overflights reduce the legitimacy of both the Lebanese government and the LAF, and make UNIFIL appear ineffective in its enforcement of
UNSCR 1701. The ability of the Israeli air force to overfly Lebanon with impunity is a direct result of the fact that the LAF has virtually no organized air
defense capability.46 While the United States has agreed to provide the LAF
with a wide range of military systems for defensive purposes, America has
not yet approved the transfer of such technology as air defense weapons or
anti-tank missiles, weaponry that could potentially alter the tactical balance
of power in the region. Meanwhile, Hezbollah demonstrated impressive
anti-tank missile capability during the July war and is now reported to be acquiring advanced man-portable surface-to-air missiles from Iran. 47 /48 If the
strategy to minimize or eliminate Hezbollah influence is to empower the LAF
and the central government, then it needs to demonstrate a military capability
that might be considered threatening to Israel.
A major consideration for the United States in providing economic
aid and humanitarian assistance should be how such assistance promotes and
strengthens the Lebanese government. To its credit, the United States did a
great deal in the aftermath of the July war in providing immediate humanitarian relief. Additional support has come in the areas of food aid, de-mining
funds, and funding for water, sanitation, and health projects. However, 90
percent of $108 million that the United States obligated in fiscal year
2006-2007 for humanitarian assistance was disbursed to nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs) such as Mercy Corps, World Vision, and Catholic Relief Services, as well as to various UN relief agencies. Only 10 percent went
directly to aid to the government of Lebanon or for administrative costs. 49
While NGOs may be the most expeditious and cost-effective way to dispense
relief in the immediate aftermath of the conflict, the almost exclusive reliance
on western aid organizations does little to enhance the Lebanese government’s capacity or its legitimacy in the eyes of its citizens. In the context of
the larger strategic problem of empowering the Lebanese government, future
assistance should serve the dual purposes of providing services while increasing the role of the government of Lebanon in distributing those services.
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Recommendations
United Nations
Unity of effort is essential to the successful stabilization and reconstruction of Lebanon. The best means to create this unity is for the United Nations to appoint a Special Representative of the Secretary General with a
mandate to establish an integrated mission that would directly coordinate all
UN activities in Lebanon, to include UNIFIL. If the UN goal is the “territorial
integrity, sovereignty and political independence of Lebanon,” then a more
holistic and integrated approach that addresses all aspects of stabilization and
reconstruction is required. 50
Second, UNIFIL needs to coordinate more closely with the Lebanese
army, specifically by ensuring that all operations are combined (UNIFIL and
LAF) operations. This change will meet the requirements of UNSCR 1701 to
“accompany and support,” and minimize the likelihood of accidental engagements between the Lebanese army and the Israeli Defense Forces along the Blue
Line. UNIFIL should also bolster its ability to advise, train, and assist the Lebanese army within its sector. In addition to traditional military training, any assistance should empower and encourage the Lebanese army in its effort to assist the
population in South Lebanon. The LAF and UNIFIL need to work side-by-side
in operating field hospitals, providing medical and dental services, conducting
civil engineering projects, and rendering other assistance that will benefit both
the LAF and the local population. Over time, a coordinated effort to train and
equip the Lebanese army will serve two strategic goals. It will empower the
army to capably replace both UNIFIL and Hezbollah. It is imperative that this increased capability allows the LAF to demonstrate that it is fully capable of defending the territorial integrity of Lebanon. Simultaneously, these actions will
demonstrate the Lebanese government’s commitment to the welfare of the impoverished south, enhancing the legitimacy of the Lebanese government, and diminishing the population’s reliance on Hezbollah.
United States
The most important step the United States can take to support the Lebanese government is to expedite the delivery of promised funds and assistance.
Rather than relying on wartime supplemental funding legislation to fund aid
projects, the President and the Congress should reconsider the size of the foreign operations budget and the annual timeliness of its passage. While the Department of Defense (DOD) has been given limited authority to reprogram
funds to meet emerging regional requirements, the Department of State (DOS)
has no such authority.51 In the case of both DOD and DOS, the severe lag in delivery of funds and equipment has placed the Lebanese government at risk.
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While the effort to train and equip the Lebanese Armed Forces is
strategically important, the United States should weight future assistance in
favor of economic and social aid versus military assistance. The ratio of security assistance to economic support funds should be 1:2 (a reversal of the current ratio). This ratio is required if the current government is to address the
dire conditions impacting the Lebanese economy. An increase in economic
funding will provide tangible benefits to the population and ameliorate many
of the conditions that permit the insurgency to thrive. More importantly, the
bulk of the economic aid provided by the United States should be administered by the government of Lebanon rather than western NGOs. Regimens
and conditionality can be emplaced to inhibit corruption, but it is imperative
that the United States use its assistance to empower Lebanon in its efforts to
build governmental capacity and serve its people.
While US funds and equipment are vitally important to improving
the capabilities of the Lebanese army, the United States is caught in the unfortunate dilemma that any effort to provide training within Lebanon by American personnel would raise their public profile. A more viable approach would
be to financially support a UNIFIL-led training assistance mission. As the effort to train and equip the LAF matures, the United States might consider
modifying arms transfer policies to permit the LAF to field a defensive capability (e.g., air defense and anti-tank missiles) providing a credible deterrent
to aggression. A credible deterrent is key to the LAF’s ability to replace
Hezbollah as defender of the Lebanese people.
Finally, there is no doubt that Lebanon’s neighbors must play a strategic role in the international community’s effort to stabilize and reconstruct Lebanon, particularly Syria and Iran. Both the United Nations and the United States
need to make a concerted effort to engage Syria and Iran on the subject of Lebanon within the context of Middle East peace. Recent American initiatives to talk
directly with North Korea and to participate in direct talks with Syria and Iran on
the subject of Iraq provide promising precedents. While the problems of Lebanon will not be resolved outside of Lebanon, recent history has shown that outside influence can either exacerbate or mitigate many of these challenges.

Conclusion
The provision for more and better-armed peacekeepers and a significant increase in the security forces of the Lebanese government are not the answers to a lasting peace in Lebanon. To be successful, the United Nations
intervention must change from a force separation mission to a holistic nationbuilding effort. The strategy underpinning this effort needs to recognize the
insurgency within Lebanon and develop a campaign to address the conditions
which give rise to that insurgency. First and foremost, this integrated camAutumn 2007
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paign should increase the capacity of the Lebanese government in its efforts
to provide good governance and services. Adapting the current US aid program to support a UN-led integrated effort would be the most effective use of
funding. Additionally, it will provide a positive example of the “carrots” that
the United States offers to accompany the many “sticks” it wields in its war on
terrorism. Without this holistic approach, Lebanon will certainly return to the
cycle of violence that it has suffered for the past 30 years.
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